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“BARTENDER, I’LL HAVE A BEER AND A DISABILITY”; 
ALCOHOLISM AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: 
AFFIRMING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE INDIVIDUALIZED 
INQUIRY IN DETERMINING THE DEFINITION OF DISABILITY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Congress, recognizing the need for legislation to protect 
individuals with disabilities, enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(hereinafter ADA), with the stated purpose of eliminating discrimination 
against them.1  In the ten years since the passage of the ADA,2 administrative 
and judicial interpretations have resulted in differing views on several of the 
statute’s substantive points.  Conflicting views are evident in the numerous 
disagreements among the circuits over which plaintiffs in particular qualify as 
an “individual with a disability”3 for the purposes of an ADA discrimination 
claim.4  Disputes frequently arise when the plaintiff’s alleged disability does 
not fall into the realm of a commonly held notion of disability.5  This comment 
will examine one such inconsistency, namely the current circuit split 
concerning the status of a person who suffers from alcoholism as a “qualified 
 
 1. The Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994).  For information 
concerning the ADA as a whole, see generally Development in the Law: III. The Americans With 
Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Potential, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1602 (1996). 
 2. The ADA was enacted in 1990, however, it did not become effective until July 26, 1992.  
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 3. In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff has the burden of 
demonstrating that: (1) the defendant is a covered entity, (2) she has a disability, (3) she is 
otherwise qualified, and (4) she was discriminated against “because of” her disability.  42 U.S.C 
§ 12112(a) (1994). 
 4. “The term ‘qualified individual with a disability’ means an individual with a disability 
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.”  42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
 5. Examples of such alleged disabilities include: plaintiffs with asthma, see Webb v. Clyde 
L. Choate Mental Health and Dev. Ctr., 230 F.3d 991 (7th Cir. 2000) (asserting that asthmatic 
plaintiff was not a qualified individual under the ADA); carpal tunnel syndrome, see McKay v. 
Toyota Motor Manu., 110 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1997) (asserting that plaintiff’s carpal tunnel 
syndrome does not qualify as a disability under ADA); and colorblindness, see Ferguson v. 
Whirlpool Corp., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12905 (W.D. AK Apr. 5, 2000) (denying colorblind 
plaintiff relief under ADA by asserting the ability to distinguish colors in not a major life 
activity). 
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individual with a disability.”6  The Fourth Circuit, in Little v. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation,7 and the Seventh Circuit, in Duda v. Board of Education of 
Franklin Park Public School District No. 84,8 both assert that alcoholism is a 
per se disability.9  In contrast, the Fifth Circuit, in Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co.,10 
and the Tenth Circuit, in Nelson v. Williams Field Services,11 argue that in 
order to determine if a plaintiff’s alcoholism qualifies as a disability, an 
individualized inquiry must be made into whether alcoholism substantially 
limits a major life activity of the individual.12  This comment will begin a 
discussion of the history and background of the ADA, alcoholism in general, 
and the general provisions of the ADA that discuss alcoholism.  Next, this 
comment will discuss the circuit split in light of the purposes and statutory 
construction of Title I, which governs disability discrimination actions in an 
employment setting.13  This comment will also discuss the differences between 
 
 6. This comment will focus on only the Fourth, Seventh, Fifth and Tenth Circuit cases 
because of their relative importance in defining the two sides of the circuit split and the individual 
cases’ impact on other circuits.  It must be noted, however, that other circuits have taken a 
position on the issue of the necessity of an individualized inquiry for individuals asserting 
alcoholism as a disability.  The First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and the 
Federal Circuits use a per se approach.  See, e.g., Martin v. Barnesville Exempted Village School 
Dist. Bd. of Ed., 209 F.3d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 2000); Farley v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 197 
F.3d 1322, 1330 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999); Singer v. Office of the Senate Sergeant at Arms, 173 F.3d 
837, 839 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Evans v. Federal Express Corp., 133 F.3d 137, 139 (1st Cir. 1998); 
Brennan v. New York City Police Dept., 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 1923, 8 (2nd Cir. 1998); 
Newland v. Dalton, 81 F.3d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1996).  The Fifth, Tenth and the D.C. Circuits 
advocate the individualized inquiry approach to determine if a claimant is an individual with a 
disability.  See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Jaffee New York 
Decorating, 25 F.3d 1080, 1083-4 (D.C. Cir. 1994).  The Eighth Circuit is split on this issue.  See, 
e.g., Wallin v. Minnesota Dept. of Corrections, 153 F.3d 681, 687 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998) (using the 
individualized inquiry and asserting that the plaintiff did not demonstrate that his alcoholism 
impaired a major life activity); Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820, 824 n.5 
(8th Cir. 1997) (recognizing alcoholism is a disability under the ADA). 
 7. Little v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 8. Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
 9. 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1998); 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 10. Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 
(1998). 
 11. Nelson v. Williams Field Services, 216 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 12. Id. at 1088; Burch 119 F.3d at 305. 
 13. The ADA is divided into several titles.  Titles I through IV each cover a different 
segment of society.  For purposes of Title I a “covered entity” is an employer, employment 
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.  42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994).  
Title II is applicable to public entities.  “Public entities” include any state or local government, 
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or 
local government, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, and any commuter authority.  42 
U.S.C. § 12131 (1994).  Title III covers public accommodations and services operated by private 
entities.  42 U.S.C. § 12181 (1994).  Title IV sets standards for telecommunications services for 
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alcoholism and the traditionally conceived notions of disability14 as well as its 
overall status as a disability for the purposes of the ADA.  This author will 
then analyze the circuit splits to conclude that alcoholism should not be 
considered a per se disability, but that the disability status of an individual with 
alcoholism should be determined by a full individualized inquiry into whether 
their alcoholism “substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.”15 
II.  HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
President George Bush signed the bipartisan and popularly supported 
Americans with Disabilities Act into law on July 26, 1990.16  The ADA is 
rooted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, however, the ADA is more detailed 
and far-reaching.17  Notably, the ADA expanded the Rehabilitation Act by 
increasing the number of private entities that are prevented from discriminating 
against people with disabilities.18  When President Bush signed the law he 
remarked that the ADA “promises to open up all aspects of American life to 
individuals with disabilities” and “signals the end to the unjustified segregation 
and exclusion of persons with disabilities from the mainstream of American 
life.”19  The potential impact of the ADA was demonstrated by Congressional 
findings that showed forty-three million Americans have some type of mental 
 
hearing and speech-impaired individuals.  47 U.S.C. § 225 (1994).  This comment will not 
discuss the status of alcoholism as a disability in relation to the entities covered in titles II 
thorough IV because my focus is on the employment setting as defined in Title I. 
 14. For the purposes of the ADA, a disability differs from an impairment.  A person’s 
impairment may rise to the level of a disability if, when compared to the general population, she 
is “unable to perform a major life activity” or is “significantly restricted as to the condition, 
manner or duration under which” he can perform the major life activity.  Duda, 113 F.3d at 1058 
n. 5 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001)). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(a) (1994). 
 16. Catherine J. Lanctot, Ad Hoc Decision Making and Per Se Prejudice: How 
Individualizing the Determination of “Disability” Undermines the ADA, 42 VILL. L. REV. 327, 
328 (1997). 
 17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (Supp. V 1999). 
 18. The coverage of the Rehabilitation Act was severely limited and only prohibited 
discrimination by federal executive agencies, federal grantees, and federal contractors.  29 U.S.C. 
§ 794 (1974).  However, the ADA is more comprehensive and affects a greater number of 
individuals.  See supra note 13.  For a more complete explanation of the federal law starting with 
the Rehabilitation Act and leading up to the enactment of the ADA, see generally Mary Nebgen, 
Note, Narrowing the Class of Individuals With Disabilities: Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 31 
MCGEORGE L. REV. 1129, 1132 (2000).  For a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, specifically 
the definition of the term “handicapped,” see generally Maureen O’Connor, ‘Defining Handicap’ 
for Purposes of Employment Discrimination, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 633, 639-649 (1988). 
 19. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 26, 1990). 
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or physical disability.20  Congress also found that “historically society has 
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and despite some 
improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem.”21  As a 
result of their findings, Congress stated its purpose was “to provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against 
individuals with disabilities”22 and “ to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”23 
Although Congress asserted that they provided clear “standards addressing 
discrimination,”24 critics of the ADA maintained that the law would result in 
an onslaught of litigation by individuals claiming they were entitled to 
protections under the Act.25  Critics contended that the ADA’s definition of 
“disability” was too vague,26 and as a result, people would seek to expand it in 
 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (1994). 
 21. Id. (a)(2). 
 22. Id. (b)(1). 
 23. Id. (b)(2). 
 24. Id.  See also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings on H.R. 2273 Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 190 (1989) [hereinafter Hearings]  (statement of Chairman 
Jack Brooks) (asserting that in order to protect the rights of the disabled the legislation must be 
“as clear and precise as possible, so that those who are affected by its provisions understand what 
their duties are and can comply with them”). 
 25. Gary S. Becker, Are We Hurting or Helping the Disabled?, BUSINESS WEEK, August 2, 
1999, at 21.  See also Nancy R. Mudrick, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Social Contract or 
Special Privilege?: Employment Discrimination Laws for Disability: Utilization and Outcome, 
549 ANNALS 53, 54 (1997). 
 26. In order to remove some of the vagueness of the ADA, Congress authorized the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to issue regulations to aid the implementation of 
Title I provisions.  42 U.S.C. § 12116 (1994).  There has been a considerable amount of debate, 
however, as to the amount of deference courts should give the EEOC regulations that explain 
provisions not contained within Title I.  The Supreme Court discussed the deference to be given 
to the regulations in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 
837, 842-43 (1984).  The Chevron Court developed a two-part test to determine when to defer to 
agency regulations.  Id.  First, if the intent of Congress is clear on the face of the statute, then the 
court must give deference to the statute itself.  Id.  However, if the statute is silent or ambiguous 
on an issue, the court must determine if the agency’s determination is based on a possible 
construction of the statute.  Id.  The judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory 
construction.  Id.  The Supreme Court further discussed this concern in Sutton v. United Air 
Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478-80, (1999).  The Court noted that no administrative agency was 
given authorization to administer regulations for the generally applicable provisions of the code, 
specifically §§ 12101-12102, that fall outside of Titles I-IV.  Id.  Importantly, no administrative 
agency was given authority to define “disability,” which is at issue in this comment.  The EEOC, 
however, issued regulations for the definition of “disability” and further defined “physical or 
mental impairment,” “substantially limits,” and “major life activities.”  Id.  The Supreme Court, 
however, did not have the opportunity to comment on the proper amount of deference to be given 
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order to obtain protection under the Act.27  In the employment arena, persons 
critical of the ADA remarked that even though the ADA had a worthwhile 
purpose, it was likely to “result in a plethora of litigation and a wholesale 
revision of many companies’ personnel policies and programs.”28  President 
Bush, however, countered that fears of increased litigation were “misplaced.”29  
The President asserted that the existing case law and standards from the 
Rehabilitation Act,30 would guide employers on how to properly meet their 
obligations under the ADA.31  Criticism by media and news sources who 
charged vagueness proved to be telling, however, as the principally litigated 
“disabilities” under the ADA involve people alleging discrimination over 
afflictions that are hard to verify, such as, stress, drug addiction and 
alcoholism.32  In this context, the split among the circuits has developed. 
 
to the EEOC regulations because the parties in Sutton agreed to accept the regulations as valid.  
Id.  Furthermore, the ADA EEOC regulations are basically identical to the Rehabilitation Act 
regulations, with the exception that the ADA EEOC regulations address the issue of mitigation as 
defined in Sutton.  The Supreme Court in Bragdon v. Abbott asserted that administrative agency 
guidelines that implement a statute “constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to 
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”  Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 
642 (1998) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134. 139-40 (1994)).  With this 
statement, the Court approved the use of Rehabilitation Act regulations to interpret the term 
“disability.”  Therefore, because Congress intended Rehabilitation Act regulations to be 
applicable to the ADA, the EEOC regulations defining “disability” can be viewed as legitimate.  
See infra note 31. 
 27. Becker, supra note 25, at 21. 
 28. MARK A. DEBERNARDO, DRUG AND ALCOHOL ABUSE PREVENTION AND THE ADA: AN 
EMPLOYER’S GUIDE, 20 (1992).  See also Development in the Law: III.  The Americans With 
Disabilities Act: Great Progress, Greater Potential, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1615-8 (1996) 
(asserting that the ADA’s major problem is the use of general standards instead of clearly-defined 
rules which has had the unfortunate effect of strained relations between employer and employees 
and increased litigation, although noting that in his opinion, this later concern has not yet 
materialized). 
 29. Statement on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 26 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1165 (July 26, 1990). 
 30. See supra note 26. 
 31. The Rehabilitation Act, signed seventeen years before, is the precursor to the ADA, 
therefore, Congress statutorily asserted that the case law, regulations, and standards developed 
under the Rehabilitation Act would apply to the ADA: 
Except as provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a 
lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
(29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title. 
42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).  See also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1998) 
(asserting the statutory intent of using the Rehabilitation Act regulations in order to construe the 
definition of disability under the ADA). 
 32. Becker, supra note 25, at 21.  Becker points out in this article that seven years previously 
he predicted that the “vagueness of the ADA and the litigious nature of the judicial system would 
encourage lawyers and workers to widen the concept of disability to absurd extremes.”  Id. 
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B. Alcoholism 
The National Council on Alcoholism and Drug Dependence and the 
American Society of Addiction Medicine jointly define alcoholism as: 
a primary, chronic disease with genetic, psychosocial, and environmental 
factors influencing its development and manifestations.  Alcoholism is 
characterized by a continuous or periodic impaired control over drinking; 
preoccupation with alcohol; and use of alcohol despite adverse consequences 
and distortions in thinking, most notably denial.33 
Furthermore, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
defines alcoholism as a substance dependence involving a “cluster of 
cognitive, behavioral, and psychological symptoms indicating that the 
individual continues use of the substance despite significant substance-related 
problems.”34  In fact, the physical effects of alcohol exhibit themselves 
differently from person to person, including differences in resulting health and 
social problems.35  A key element of alcoholism, however, is addiction.36  Both 
legal and medical journals have not been able to agree on an “exact, 
universally-accepted definition” of the term addiction.37  For example, 
alcoholism, like other addictive behaviors, is often characterized as a disease, 
and, therefore, is considered irreversible and uncontrollable without total 
avoidance.38  What is known about addiction is that it develops progressively 
and is characterized by a loss of self-control and competence in decision-
 
 33. Job Accommodation Network, Ideas for Accommodating Persons With Alcoholism, at 
http://janweb.icdi.wvu.edu/media/alcohol.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2001) [hereinafter Job 
Accommodation Network]. 
 34. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 176 (4th ed. 1994).  
This definition was relied on by the dissent in Tomlin v. Anderson, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1752, 
16-17 (1997) (6th Cir. 1997).  Tomlin dealt with a violation of an Ohio Law that prohibited 
possessing a firearm while disabled.  Id. 
 35. Depending on the individual, the short-term effects of alcohol consumption may include 
“distorted vision, hearing and coordination, altered perceptions and emotions, impaired judgment, 
and bad breath and hangovers.”  Job Accommodation Network, supra note 33.  The long-term 
effects of alcohol use may include “loss of appetite, vitamin deficiencies, stomach ailments, skin 
problems, sexual impotence, liver damage, heart and central nervous system damage, and 
memory loss.”  Id. 
 36. Rex Greene, M.D., Towards a Policy of Mercy: Addiction in the 1990s, 3 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 227, 229 (1991). 
 37. Marvin F. Hill, Jr. & Tammy Westhoff, “No Song Unsung, No Wine Untasted” – 
Employee Addictions, Depedencies, and Post-Discharge Rehabilitation: Another Look at the 
Victim Defense in Labor Arbitration, 47 DRAKE L. REV. 399, 405 (1999). 
 38. Addiction a Whole New View, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, at 32 (1994).  Alcoholics 
Anonymous has popularized the disease theory.  Id.  Proponents of this theory point to the 
assertion that children of alcoholics have a higher risk of alcohol abuse than children of non-
alcoholics to bolster their argument that in alcoholism genetics plays an important role in 
determining whether a person will be affected, such as in cancer and other inherited diseases.  Id. 
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making.39  From a physical standpoint, “addiction generally requires substance 
dependence with tolerance and withdrawal effects.”40 
Left untreated, an individual’s alcoholism has the potential for strong 
impact in their employment setting.  In the middle and late stages of 
alcoholism, for example, the following might occur: poor productivity, erratic 
performance, erratic behavior, excessive or patterned absenteeism and/or 
tardiness, difficulty cooperating, carelessness, negligence, and disinterest.41  In 
addition to this potential behavior, alcoholism has a strong impact on society 
demonstrated by the number of people it affects.  Alcohol is widely used by the 
American population.  More than seven percent of people ages eighteen years 
and older have problems with drinking (13.8 million people), which includes 
8.1 million alcoholic individuals.42  Demonstrating the relevance of the this 
figure to the employment setting, 6.6 percent of Americans who work in full-
time jobs, 4.9 percent of part-time workers, and 10.4 percent of unemployed 
workers report heavy drinking.43  These figures coupled with the known effects 
of alcoholism in an employment setting demonstrate the importance of 
protecting an individual whose major life activities are affected by alcoholism 
from employment discrimination.  Furthermore, the potential impact of 
workers who suffer from alcoholism on the workplace illustrates the 
importance of developing a clear standard for evaluating the status of alcoholic 
employees under the ADA. 
C. Alcoholism and the ADA generally 
Alcoholism is categorized as a mental disability for the purposes of the 
ADA.44  As a mental disability, alcoholism is categorized with other 
disabilities such as behavior disorders, schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, stress, 
and anxiety.45  According to the EEOC, a mental impairment refers to “any 
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness and specific learning disabilities.”46  
 
 39. Greene, supra note 36, at 229.  Greene also points out that repetitive use of an addictive 
substance stems from several factors including, genetics, personality, and the presence of a 
dysfunctional family.  Id. 
 40. Hill & Westhoff, supra note 37, at 405. 
 41. Jonathan A. Segel, Alcoholic Employees and the Law, 38 H.R. MAGAZINE 87 (1993). 
 42. Job Accommodation Network, supra note 33. 
 43. Id.  Heavy drinking is defined as “drinking five or more drinks per occasion on five or 
more days in the past thirty days.”  Id. 
 44. JOHN W. PARRY, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
9 (1997). 
 45. Id. at 10. 
 46. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2001).  The EEOC defines physical impairment or mental 
impairment as “(1) [a]ny physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or 
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems; neurological, 
musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including speech organs), cardiovascular, 
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The ADA expressly excludes certain conditions from the definition of 
disability even if they substantially limit a major life activity.47  Current users 
of illegal drugs, for example, are excluded from ADA protection, even though 
drug abuse typically “substantially limits” an individual’s life activities.48  
While not specifically excluded, alcoholism is treated differently than other 
disabilities.49 
Congress has stated that alcoholics may qualify for disability status;50 
however, several limitations remove certain types of alcohol-related activity 
from protected status.51  For example, an employer may prohibit the 
consumption of alcohol at the workplace52 and require that employees not be 
under the influence of alcohol at the workplace.53  The ADA also requires 
employees to act in conformance with the Drug Free Workplace Act of 1988.54  
Importantly, an alcoholic employee can be held to the “same qualification 
standards for employment or job performance and behavior” as other 
employees are held, “even if any unsatisfactory performance or behavior is 
related to the . . . alcoholism of such employee.”55  Also, relying on the 
statutory provisions regarding alcohol at the workplace, courts have drawn a 
 
reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or (2) [a]ny 
mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional 
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2001).  Note that 
the Rehabilitation Act’s EEOC regulations definition of “physical or mental impairment” is 
identical to the definition in the EEOC’s ADA regualtions.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(b) (2001). 
 47. 42 U.S.C. §12211 (1994) (excluding from the definition of disability: homosexuality, 
bisexuality, transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender identity 
disorders not resulting from physical impairments, other sexual behavior disorders, compulsive 
gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psychoactive substance abuse disorders resulting from 
current illegal use of drugs).  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides the same exclusions.  
See 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (1994). 
 48. The prohibition against protection for illegal drug users does not apply to people who 
have successfully completed or are participating in a drug rehabilitation program and no longer 
use drugs, or are regarded as using drugs.  42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (1994).  To ensure an employee 
is no longer using drugs, an employer may administer drug testing.  Id. 
 49. PARRY, supra note 44, at 42. 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1994).  See also Wendy K. Voss, Employing the Alcoholic 
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 895, 898 (1992). 
 51. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(C)(v) (1994). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (c)(1) (1994). 
 53. Id. (c)(2). 
 54. Id. (c)(3).  The Drug-Free Workplace Act, 41 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (Supp. V 1999). 
 55. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c)(4) (1994).  See Maddox v. Univ. of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843, 847 
(6th Cir. 1995) (asserting that an alcoholic assistant football coach, who was fired after driving 
while intoxicated and claimed that his conduct resulted from his disability, could be held to the 
same performance and behavior standards as other employees even if the conduct was related to 
his alcoholism). 
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distinction between alcoholism and alcohol-related misconduct.56  Following 
this distinction, alcohol-related misconduct is not protected under the ADA, 
and employers may take steps to terminate employment for this reason.57  
These provisions demonstrate how alcoholism is regarded differently from 
other mental health disabilities in the ADA.58 
III.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A circuit split currently exists concerning the disposition of an alcoholic 
individual as a qualified individual with as disability.  The number of working 
Americans who consider themselves alcoholics demonstrates the importance of 
this split.59  Furthermore, for the purposes of Title I (as well as Titles II 
through IV) a plaintiff must meet the prima facie elements of an ADA case,60 
which includes qualifying as an “individual with a disability.”61  If a plaintiff 
fails to meet this burden the case is subject to dismissal.  The ADA takes its 
definition of an “individual with a disability”62 verbatim from the 
Rehabilitation Act’s definition of “handicapped.”63  The relevant part of the 
 
 56. See James H. Coil, III & Lori J. Shapiro, The ADA at Three Years: A Statute in Flux; 
Americans With Disabilities Act, EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 5, 13 (1996).  Coil and Shapiro cite as 
examples: an employer may discharge an alcoholic employee who reports for work intoxicated, 
see Flynn v. Raytheon Co., 868 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mass. 1994); an employer may fire an employee 
for absenteeism resulting from incarceration for drinking while intoxicated, see Leary v. Dalton, 
58 F.3d 748 (1st Cir. 1995); an alcoholic football coach, fired after arrested for drunk driving, 
was found not to be fired as a result of his alcoholism, but for the negative publicity surrounding 
his criminal conduct, see Maddox v. Univ. of Tennessee, 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995). 
 57. Coil & Shapiro, supra note 56, at 13. 
 58. For more general information on alcoholism and the ADA, see generally James P. 
Sadler, The Alcoholic and the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: The “Booze Made Me Do 
It” Argument Finds Little Recognition in Employment Discrimination Actions, 28 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 861 (1997).  For information concerning psychiatric disabilities and the ADA, see generally 
Stephanie Proctor Miller, Keeping the Promise: The ADA and Employment Discrimination on the 
Basis of Psychiatric Disability, 85 CAL. L. REV. 701 (1997). 
 59. See supra note 42. 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). 
 61. Id. § 12102(2) (1994). 
 62. The term “disability” means, with respect to an individual – 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life 
activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having an impairment. 
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).  The ADA uses the same language as the Rehabilitation Act.  See 
29 U.S.C. § 704(8)(A)-(B) (1994). 
 63. 20 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).  The ADA definition of a qualified individual with a 
disability is the same as the Rehabilitation Act’s definition of handicapped, which demonstrates 
Congress’ intent that the case law and regulations of the Rehabilitation Act were to be imported 
to the ADA.  Congress explicitly stated: “Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in 
this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V 
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definition of disability is the interpretation of: “a physical or mental 
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of 
such individual.”64  The key to this definition is an understanding of what 
constitutes a “substantial limitation”65 and what qualifies as a “major life 
activity.”66  This comment will first look at the status of an alcoholic plaintiff 
from the per se point of view (Fourth and Seventh Circuits)67 and, secondly, by 
the circuits that advocate an individualized inquiry (Fifth and Tenth Circuits).68 
A. Alcoholism as a per se disability 
Since the passage of the ADA the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have 
consistently held that alcoholism is a per se disability,69 often making this 
determination based on the belief that alcoholism is a disease.70  As a result, in 
circuits which accept this per se assertion, complainants who can demonstrate 
that they are alcoholics do not need to undergo the individualized inquiry into 
how alcoholism “substantially limits” a major life activity.  By relying on 
alcoholism as a per se disability, the court is not required to perform the 
individualized inquiry analysis.  As a result, an individual who can 
demonstrate she is an alcoholic is able to claim she is disabled for the purposes 
of the ADA, but is also subject to the statutory provisions applying specifically 
to and limiting the coverage of alcoholics.71 
 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal 
agencies pursuant to such title.”  42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (1994).  See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624, 632 (1998) (advocating that “Congress’ repetition of a well-established term carries the 
implication that Congress intended the term to be construed in accordance with pre-existing 
regulatory interpretations”). 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (1994). 
 65. “Substantially limits” means “[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average 
person in the general population can perform,” or “[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, 
manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that 
same major life activity.”  29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2001).  Factors to be considered in determining 
if an individual is substantially limited in a major life activity include: “the nature and severity of 
the impairment . . . the duration or expected duration of the impairment,” and “the permanent or 
long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the 
impairment.”  Id. 
 66. “Major Life Activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual 
tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working.”  29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(i) (2001). 
 67. Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 
1998); Little v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 68. Nelson v. Williams Field Services, 216 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2000); Burch v. Coca-Cola, 
Co., 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 (1998). 
 69. In addition, the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and the Federal 
Circuits assert that alcoholism is a per se disability.  See supra note 6. 
 70. For discussion of alcoholism as a disease, see supra note 38. 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1994). 
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In Little v. Federal Bureau of Investigations,72 the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit expressly held that alcoholism is a per se 
disability.73  Plaintiff Charles Little, Jr., a known alcoholic, worked for the FBI 
for more than seven years before he was fired.74  Although Little’s supervisors 
were aware of his alcohol problems, they nevertheless consistently rated his 
performance as at least “fully satisfactory.”75  In December of 1989, Little, 
while off-duty, was charged with driving while intoxicated.76  This incident 
prompted Little to ask for assistance from his supervisor so he could get 
professional treatment for his alcoholism.77  Little completed an outpatient 
alcohol program in March 1990, and was subsequently reinstated to full duty 
on May 4, 1990.78  On May 16, 1990, Little became intoxicated while on duty 
and had to be escorted home by his co-workers.79  Following this incident 
Little completed an inpatient treatment program.80  As a result of this incident, 
the FBI asked Little to resign, which he refused.81  Shortly thereafter Little was 
terminated because of his “inability to conform to the FBI’s established 
standards that special agents must remain mentally and physically fit for duty 
at all times.”82  Little then filed a lawsuit under sections 501 and 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.83 
The district court dismissed Little’s claims,84 and upon appeal Little 
asserted he was fired because of his alcoholism.85  The FBI asserted that Little 
 
 72. 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 73. Id. at 257. 
 74. Id. at 256. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Little, 1 F.3d at 256. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Little, 1 F.3d at 257 (quoting the FBI’s Notification of Personnel Action dated January 
17, 1991).  Id. 
 83. Id.  Section 501 imposes an affirmative duty on handicapped agencies to accommodate 
handicapped individuals.  29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. V. 1999).  Section 504 states that “no 
otherwise handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by an 
executive agency.”  29 U.S.C. § 794 (1974).  Recall that Congress intended Rehabilitation Act 
case law to apply to ADA cases.  For a discussion on the deference to the Rehabilitation Act case 
law, see supra note 31. Therefore, reliance on a Rehabilitation Act case is proper when discussing 
the provisions of the ADA. 
 84. Little, 1 F.3d at 257.  The district court dismissed Little’s claim because it found that he 
was not within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act because he was not “otherwise qualified.”  
Id. 
 85. Id. 
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was not fired because of his alcoholism, but because of his misconduct.86  In 
discussing whether Little met the prima facie elements of his case, the court 
stated; “It is settled that alcoholism is a handicapping condition within the 
meaning of the Act.”87  The Fourth Circuit decided that Little was an 
individual with a disability without performing an individualized inquiry to see 
if alcoholism placed a substantial limitation on his major life activities.88  The 
court relied on a statement by the Attorney General, who concluded that 
alcoholics are handicapped individuals for purposes of the Rehabilitation 
Act.89  The court noted that the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare 
and the Civil Service Commission relied on the Attorney General’s opinion in 
writing the Section 504 regulations.90  Although the court recognized that such 
agency statements are non-binding authority, the court gave the regulations 
“considerable deference,”91 interpreting them to label alcoholism as a per se 
handicapping condition.92 
In Duda v. Board of Education of Franklin Park Public School District No. 
84,93 a case tried under the ADA, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit also asserted that alcoholism is a per se disability.94  John 
Duda, a recovering alcoholic and diagnosed manic depressive with bipolar 
disorder, worked as a night custodian at a junior high school for eight years.95  
The defendant employer knew of his conditions.96  During his work breaks, to 
help relieve anxiety or depression, Duda would write his private thoughts in a 
personal diary.97  One of Duda’s co-workers stole the diary and distributed 
 
 86. Id.  This case primarily stands for the principle that an alcoholic employee can be held to 
the same standards of misconduct as a non-alcoholic employee.  Therefore, the FBI was not 
required to reasonably accommodate Little by letting him drink on the job.  Id.  For more 
information, see generally Eric Harbrook Cottrell, There’s Too Much Confusion Here, and I 
Can’t Get No Relief: Alcoholic Employees and the Federal Rehabilitation Act in Little v. FBI, 72 
N.C. L. REV. 1753 (1994). 
 87. Little, 1 F.3d at 257. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 258. 
 90. Id.  The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare is now the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services.  Id. 
 91. Little, 1 F.3d at 258. 
 92. Id.  Ultimately the Fourth Circuit concluded that Little failed to state a claim under the 
Rehabilitation Act because he could not show that he was terminated “solely by reason of his 
handicap.”  Id. 
 93. Duda v. Bd. of Educ. of Franklin Park Sch. Dist. No. 84, 133 F.3d 1054 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 94. Id. at 1059. 
 95. Id. at 1055. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
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copies of incriminating pages to co-workers and the school administration.98  
After reading the diary, the school administration told Duda he could not return 
to work until he received a “clean bill of health” from his doctor.99  Duda then 
obtained a note from his psychiatrist who informed the administration that 
Duda was stable enough to work.100  The defendant then required that Duda 
comply with other conditions before he could return to work, including 
continued attendance at Alcoholic’s Anonymous meetings, counseling to 
continue taking his medication, notifying the school when his medication was 
changed, and agreeing to a transfer to a different school.101  Also, when Duda 
inquired about a better position, he was told not to apply because of the diary 
incident.102  Duda brought an ADA claim103 alleging he was segregated from 
others at school and discouraged from applying for the new job.104 
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss Duda’s 
complaint.  The Seventh Circuit, however, reversed and remanded on Duda’s 
ADA claim asserting that Duda qualified as an individual with a disability.105  
The court found that medically diagnosed mental conditions, like alcoholism 
and manic depression, which Duda was diagnosed as having, are recognized 
disabilities under the ADA.106  The court stated: “Our cases have distinguished 
between claims of personal conflicts with others, or mere temperament and 
irritability, which do not amount to ‘disabilities’ under the ADA, and 
medically diagnosed medical conditions, like the ones from which Mr. Duda 
suffers, which are recognized disabilities under the ADA.”107  Relying on other 
Seventh Circuit cases,108 the court, in a footnote109 stated that alcoholism and 
 
 98. Duda, 133 F.3d at 1055.  Allegedly, Duda’s diary contained a death threat against 
Duda’s supervisor, but this information was presented at a status hearing and not in the 
complaint. Id. at 1056 n.1. 
 99. Id. at 1056. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id.  Duda moved to an elementary school where no other custodians were employed and 
was asked not to have conversations with others at the school.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 1056. 
 103. Duda also brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unreasonable search and 
seizure of his diary and invasion of privacy by the reading of his diary.  Duda, 133 F.3d at 1056. 
 104. Id. at 1056. 
 105. Id. at 1059. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. The court relied on Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 635 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(recognizing parties’ agreement that alcoholism is a disability under the ADA); Bryant v. 
Madigan, 84 F.3d 246 (7th Cir. 1996) (accepting alcoholism and other addictions as disabilities); 
and Huels v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 121 F.3d 1047 (7th Cir. 1997) (accepting without discussion 
the status of alcoholism is a disability).  The court did reference Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co., 119 
F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), but did not give it deference to the decision by asserting that alcoholism 
is not a per se disability.  Duda, 133 F.3d at 1059 n.10. 
 109. Id. 
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other forms of addiction are disabilities per se within the meaning of the 
ADA.110  Finding that alcoholism is a per se disability, the court did not 
undergo an individualized inquiry into whether alcohol substantially limits 
Duda’s major life activities.111 
The EEOC, in its regulations and guidelines, does not provide a “laundry 
list” of disabilities.112  Instead it lists various factors that must be weighed in 
determining if a particular impairment is substantially limiting.113  This seems 
to suggest that every plaintiff’s condition must be individually analyzed.  
However, the Interpretative Guidance qualifies the requirement for a case-by-
case analysis by asserting a list of impairments that are per se disabling.114  
Therefore, an impairment that is inherently substantially limiting satisfies the 
ADA disability requirement, as a per se disability.115  Moreover, the EEOC 
Enforcement Guidance notes: “in very rare instances, impairments are so 
severe that there is no doubt that they substantially limit major life activities.  
In those cases it is undisputed that the complainant is an individual with a 
disability.”116  The EEOC Interpretative Guidance notes that as a result, many 
courts have accepted without discussion alcoholism as a disability.117 
The Little and Duda cases demonstrate that in both the Fourth and the 
Seventh circuits, an alcoholic plaintiff does not need to demonstrate how 
alcoholism substantially limits a major life activity.  Instead, a plaintiff in front 
of one of these courts must only claim that they suffer from alcoholism.  This 
is based on the belief that alcoholism, as an addictive disease, is inherently 
 
 110. Id. at 1059. 
 111. Id. at 1062.  The court ultimately found that the plaintiff’s amended complaint set forth a 
claim for relief under the ADA and the case was remanded.  Id. 
 112. EEOC Interpretative Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1630 app., § 1630.2(j) [hereinafter EEOC Interpretative Guidance]. The EEOC 
Regulations and accompanying Interpretative Guidance define the statutory terms of the ADA. 
See supra n. 26.  The ADA gives little guidance to what constitutes a disability.  Congress did not 
list specific disabilities which it intended to include because new disorders will develop in the 
future.  H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 51 (1990).  The development of such a list in the statute did 
have some support.  See Lanctot, supra note 16, at 333. 
 113. EEOC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 112, at § 1630.2(j).  “Part 1630 notes several 
factors that should be considered in making the determination of whether an impairment is 
substantially limiting.  These factors are (1) the nature and severity of the impairment, (2) the 
duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the permanent or long term impact of, or 
resulting from, the impairment.”  Id. 
 114. The Interpretative Guidance lists HIV, paralysis, and insulin dependent diabetes as a 
substantially limiting condition.  EEOC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 112, at § 1630.2. 
 115. Id. 
 116. EEOC Interim Enforcement Guidance: Definition of the Term Disability, § 902.4 (c). 
 117. Id. 
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limiting.118  Proponents of the per se rule assert that this is seen through the 
EEOC view of disability in general.119 
Advocates of the existence of per se disabilities assert that a case-by-case 
analysis of plaintiff’s medical condition has resulted in narrowing the ADA’s 
protected class.120  As a result, ADA plaintiffs are “considered in a vacuum . . . 
without reliance on other reported cases addressing the same disease.”121  
Proponents of the per se approach assert that similar cases should be relied 
upon in determining if a condition amounts to a disability.  The individualized 
inquiry is the wrong approach because it “virtually forecloses the development 
of judicial consensus as to whether certain diseases are ‘inherently 
substantially limiting.’”122  The result has been confusion among employers 
and lower courts as to whether a certain disease, particularly alcoholism, 
always amounts to a disability.123 
B. The necessity of an individualized inquiry 
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits reject the notion that alcoholism is a disability 
per se and instead advocate an individualized inquiry to determine the 
plaintiff’s disability status.124  The proponents of this method assert that an 
individualized inquiry into whether alcoholism substantially limits a major life 
activity is necessary in order to properly assess whether a person is actually 
disabled under the terms of the ADA.  Importantly, an inquiry does not 
presuppose that alcoholism can never be a disability.125  Rather alcoholism 
may be a disability if it meets the statutory test, which ensures that properly 
disabled individuals receive coverage under the ADA.126 
Proponents of the notion that alcoholism is not a per se disability point to 
the statutory provisions concerning “disability” for support.  The first question 
 
 118. For discussion of alcoholism as a disease, see supra note 38. 
 119. For an explanation of how this statutory structure works to assert certain conditions as 
per se disabling, see Michael D. Carlis & Scott A. McCabe, Are There No Per Se Disabilities 
Under the Americans With Disabilities Act?  The Fate of Asymptomatic HIV Disease, 57 MD. L. 
REV. 558, 564-7 (1998) (asserting that under the administrative regulations asymptomatic HIV is 
a per se disability). 
 120. Lanctot, supra note 16, at 332. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 333. 
 123. Id. 
 124. In addition to the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit also asserts the need for an 
individualized inquiry.  See supra note 6. 
 125. Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305, 318 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 
(1998). 
 126. Id.  See also Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co., 162 F.3d 604, 609 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating 
that the “mere status” of being an alcoholic may receive protection under the ADA); McKey v. 
Occidental Chemical Corp., 956 F. Supp 1313, 1317 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (noting that if alcoholism 
is left untreated it can rise to the level of an impairment or a disability). 
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addressed in the ADA is who should be protected, and in response the statute 
sets out a three-prong test127 to determine if a person is disabled.128  Under the 
first prong of the test, “a physical or mental impairment”129 must substantially 
limit130 a major life activity.131  Generally major life activities are basic 
functions,132 that the average person can perform.  The EEOC Technical 
Assistance Manual lists major life activities that the “average person can 
perform with little or no difficulty.”133  The list includes walking, speaking, 
breathing, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, learning, caring for 
oneself, and working.134  The EEOC notes that the list is not exclusive and 
activities such as sitting, standing, lifting or reading are also major life 
activities.135  In order to qualify for coverage under the ADA, the plaintiff must 
be substantially limited in at least one of these activities, or substantially 
limited in the ability to perform an activity compared to an average person in 
the general population.136  Factors to be considered include the impairment’s 
nature and severity, how long it will last, and its permanent or long-term 
impact.137  The EEOC notes that “these factors must be considered because, 
generally, it is not the name of an impairment or a condition that determines 
whether a person is protected by the ADA, but rather the effect of an 
impairment or condition on the life of a particular person” (emphasis added).138 
Burch v. Coca-Cola,139 a case decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, is an opinion heavily relied upon by circuits that advocate a case-
by-case analysis of alcoholic plaintiffs.140  Plaintiff Robert Burch was a 
 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).  See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2001). 
 128. Steven S. Locke, The Incredible Shrinking Protected Class: Redefining the Scope of 
Disability Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 107, 110 (1996). 
 129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2001). 
 130. Id. at § 1630.2(j). 
 131. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).  See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2001). 
 132. Locke, supra note 128, at 111. 
 133. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL OF 
THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, II-3 
(1992). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at II-4. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See supra note 133, at II-4. 
 139. Burch v. Coca-Cola, Co., 119 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1084 
(1998). 
 140. Burch has been cited by several other circuits in their determination of whether 
alcoholism is a per se disability.  In the Fifth Circuit, Burch is heavily relied upon as the seminal 
case necessitating the individualized inquiry, and it has influenced several interesting opinions 
which follow its guidelines.  See Werner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 1997 U.S. Dist. Lexis 14966 
(E.D. Pa. 1997).  The court asserted that the plaintiff, who was fired for submitting liquor store 
receipts with her overtime meal reimbursement forms, failed to demonstrate that her alcoholism 
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management-level employee with Coca-Cola as an area service manager for 
the southwest region Fountain Division.141  Burch performed well in this 
position receiving several awards; however, his evaluations stated that 
“working relationships” were a “developmental area” for him.142  In May 1992, 
Burch began confidential counseling with a clinical social worker in Coca-
Cola’s Employee Assistance Program.143  In February of 1993, the social 
worker referred Burch to a psychiatrist.144  Burch testified that he drank 
heavily during his off hours, typically eight or ten beers an evening, and while 
he did not drink during work hours he did experience hangover-like 
symptoms.145  Burch also testified that he believed his work at Coca-Cola 
aggravated his alcohol problems.146 
Cola-Cola asserted that Burch’s termination was a result of his behavior at 
an area service manager’s meeting in Atlanta in September 1993.147  At a 
company dinner, the speaker made comments about Burch, to which he took 
offense, but at which other members of the group laughed.148  Burch became 
visibly upset and mouthed obscenities toward a laughing co-worker and 
demanded that they meet outside the room.149  Burch, however, remained 
seated for the remainder of dinner.150  When Burch learned that Coca-Cola’s 
human resources department opened an investigation into his conduct, he 
 
qualified as a disability.  The court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment even 
though the plaintiff later submitted an affidavit that stated alcoholism “seriously affected” her 
ability to work and the contradictions and change in her testimony was a result of her alcoholism.  
Id.  See also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Exxon Corp., 973 F. Supp. 612 
(N.D. Texas 1997).  The court asserted that a rehabilitated substance abuser is not a qualified 
individual with a disability automatically, but he had to prove that he suffered a disability under 
the ADA.  The court relied on Burch to assert that an individual who falls under a subcategory of 
42 U.S.C. § 12114(b) (1994) is not per se disabled but had to undergo the individualized inquiry.  
Id. 
 141. Burch, 119 F.3d at 309. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 310. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Burch, 119 F.3d at 310.  Burch testified that alcohol was served at Coca-Cola functions 
and he drank with supervisors on business trips.  According to Burch, the Coca-Cola “culture” 
“amounted to a fraternity of drinkers and contributed to his alcoholism.”  Id. 
 147. Id. at 311. 
 148. Burch, 119 F.3d at 311.  The events are as follows: Max Trowbridge was the outgoing 
service manager for New York and was being transferred to Integrated Operating Systems [IOS] 
division.  Id.  Burch did not see this as a promotion, but rather the result of Trowbridge’s bad 
records as a service manager.  Id.  Trowbridge mentioned in his speech that Burch would make a 
good candidate for IOS, and that his supervisor would “enjoy” his move.  Id.  Burch considered 
Trowbridge’s comments to be an attack on his competence.  Id. 
 149. Burch, 119 F.3d at 311. 
 150. Id. 
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admitted himself to Charter Hospital for alcohol treatment.151  Burch was 
unable to return to work after treatment because he was on suspension upon 
completion of the human resource investigation.152  The investigation resulted 
in the recommendation that Burch be fired.153  Burch brought suit claiming that 
he was fired in violation of the ADA and alleging failure to accommodate and 
intentional discrimination.154  The magistrate judge dismissed the intentional 
discrimination claim but did not dismiss the reasonable accommodation 
claim.155  The case was tried before a jury which returned a verdict for Burch 
and awarded $109,000 in back pay, $700,000 in front pay, $300,000 in 
compensatory damages, and $6,000,000 in punitive damages.156  Although 
these damages were reduced, Coca-Cola appealed.157 
The Fifth Circuit overturned the trial court’s ruling, asserting that Burch 
failed to prove that he was disabled under the ADA.158  The court stated that, 
“the ADA requires employers to reasonably accommodate limitations, not 
disabilities.”159  The existence of an impairment is material to an ADA claim 
only if it substantially limits a major life activity.160  Accordingly, an 
impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity does not 
warrant ADA protection.  The court noted that the same impairment could 
limit one person and not limit another.161 
The court determined that Coca-Cola correctly contended that Burch failed 
to demonstrate he was a qualified individual with a disability under the 
ADA.162  The court primarily made this finding based on Burch’s expert 
testimony.  The expert testified about alcoholics as a class, which the court 
found was insufficient evidence to label Burch a qualified individual with a 
 
 151. Id. at 312.  Burch said he had several drinks at dinner, but did not consider himself 
intoxicated.  Id. at 311. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Burch, 119 F.3d at 311. 
 154. Id.  Burch also asserted state law claims of defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress.  Id. 
 155. Id. at 313.  Burch’s case was tried on a reasonable accommodation claim.  Id. at 314.  On 
appeal the court held that this was inappropriate because Burch did not establish that alcoholism 
substantially limited a major life activity and he failed to demonstrate that he requested a 
modification or accommodation to his job.  Burch, 119 F.3d at 314. 
 156. Id. at 313. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 315. 
 159. Id. (quoting language from Taylor v. Principal Financial Group, Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 164 
(5th Cir. 1996)). 
 160. Burch, 119 F.3d at 315.  For Burch’s reasonable accommodation claim, Burch needed to 
show that alcoholism limited his ability to perform his job at the time of the requested 
accommodation.  Id.  Without this showing, there would be nothing for an employer to 
accommodate.  Id. 
 161. Id. at 315. 
 162. Id. 
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disability.163  The court pointed out that the EEOC did not create a “laundry 
list” of impairments, and further, did not specifically classify alcoholism as a 
per se disability.164 In light of this the court noted that it “declined to adopt 
such a questionable position.”165  Burch countered by asserting that his ability 
to walk, talk, think and sleep and his memory were affected by his 
alcoholism.166  However, the court asserted: “that Burch’s inebriation was 
temporarily incapacitating is not determinative,” and that Burch produced no 
evidence that his impairments were “qualitatively different than those achieved 
by an overindulging social drinker.”167  Burch’s drinking affected his life, but 
the effect was temporary, and “permanency, not frequency, is the touchstone of 
a substantially limiting impairment of any significant duration.”168  The court, 
however, did not assert that an alcoholic can never demonstrate a substantially 
limiting impairment based on his or her alcoholism.169  In this instance, 
however, Burch’s offered impairments were the result of temporary 
inebriation, which is insufficient to demonstrate a substantially limiting 
impairment.170  With no proof that Burch’s inebriation permanently altered his 
gait, ability to speak, memory when sober, or resulted in long-term insomnia, 
Burch could not prove a substantially limiting impairment.171 
In Nelson v. Williams Field Services,172 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit relied on Burch v. Coca-Cola to assert that a plaintiff failed to 
state a claim of discrimination under the ADA.173  Nelson was an employee 
with Williams Field Services Company (“Williams”), a Utah based natural gas 
processor.174  He was employed as a field operator or gathering technician, 
requiring him to drive a truck about four hours a day and work with potentially 
explosive materials.175  Williams’ drug and alcohol policy encouraged 
employees to seek help with their addictions.176  In September 1994, Nelson 
informed his supervisor of a recent near-suicide attempt and asked for help 
 
 163. Burch, 119 F.3d at 315. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Burch, 119 F.3d at 315. 
 169. Id. at 316 n.9. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id.  Working against Burch was that he bicycled 100 to 200 miles a week while 
undergoing alcohol treatment.  Id.  He also conceded that when he began alcohol treatment his 
work was unaffected by his alcoholism.  Id. 
 172. Nelson v. Williams Health Services Co., 216 F.3d 1088 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
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with personal problems and excessive alcohol consumption on weekends.177  
With his employer’s help Nelson completed an alcohol treatment program.178  
Upon his release Nelson signed a “Return-to-Work Agreement” that required 
him as long as he worked at Williams not to consume alcohol or unauthorized 
drugs and to participate in unannounced periodic alcohol testing for five 
years.179 
In January 1997, Nelson violated the Return-to-Work Agreement when he 
was arrested for driving while intoxicated in his personal vehicle.180  Nelson 
pled guilty to drunk driving and told his supervisor.181  Williams subsequently 
fired Nelson for violating the agreement.182  Nelson sued Williams for 
violation of the ADA, among other claims.183  Nelson appealed from a 
summary judgment against all of his claims. 
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the ground that 
Nelson did not demonstrate that he was a qualified individual with a 
disability.184  Nelson’s counsel conceded that alcoholism is not a per se 
disability under the ADA and that a case-by-case determination was 
necessary.185  Based on the evidence, the district court concluded that Nelson 
did not demonstrate how alcoholism substantially limited his major life 
activities or how it affected his ability to perform his job.186  Pointing to 
Nelson’s level of competence, he received a satisfactory performance rating 
before he informed Williams of his alcohol related arrest.187  Nelson was not 
fired for his alcoholism, but for violation of his Return-to-Work Agreement.188 
In both the Fifth and Seventh Circuits, a plaintiff must demonstrate how 
his or her alcoholism substantially limits a major life activity.  In both the 
Burch and Nelson cases the court used a case-by-case analysis to determine if 
 
 177. Nelson, 216 F.3d at 1088. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id.  Return-to-work agreements were held to not be a violation of the ADA.  Id.  Periodic 
alcohol testing is not a violation of the ADA.  See also  42 U.S.C. § 12114 (1994). 
 180. Nelson, 216 F.3d at 1088. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  Management for Williams stated that the company was not willing to take the chance 
Nelson would drive the company truck after drinking and then kill someone.  The company stated 
they were not willing to assume liability if Nelson should kill someone.  Id. 
 183. Id.  Nelson also brought claims for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
wrongful termination of an implied contract and intentional infliction of emotional distress.  
Nelson, 216 F.3d at 1088. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id.  The court made reference to Burch on this point.  Nelson, 216 F.3d at 1088. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id.  Nelson not only clarified the rule governing alcoholism and the ADA in the Tenth 
Circuit; it also gives support to employers who use return-to-work agreements.  As long as the 
employee enters into the return-to-work agreement voluntarily, the court will uphold it.  Court 
Says Alcoholism Can be a Disability Under the ADA, 6 UTAH EMP. L. LETTER (Aug. 2000). 
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the plaintiff was entitled to protection under the ADA.  The EEOC reasons that 
an individualized approach is necessary because similar impairments 
sometimes vary in severity and restrict people to differing degrees.189  
Alcoholism is an appropriate example of this because different people react 
dissimilarly to the disease.190  While some people continue to function 
normally with alcoholism, others experience substantial limitations in their 
daily activities.191  Furthermore, the EEOC did not promulgate a “laundry list” 
of disabilities, but the cases under the Rehabilitation Act indicate that courts 
were willing to accept many disabilities as per se.192  Employers began to 
challenge the notion of per se disabilities, however, relying on the EEOC 
Interpretative Guidance and forcing plaintiffs to demonstrate how the disability 
substantially limits a major life activity.193  Specifically, employers assert that 
the EEOC mandates inquiry on a case-by-case basis.194  The EEOC states that 
“[t]he determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily 
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on 
the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.”  However, the 
Rehabilitation Act regulations do not expand on the manner which a disability 
should be determined.195  Therefore, the Rehabilitation Act case law that 
advocates per se disabilities are out of sync with the current EEOC position 
and the ADA.  As a result, courts moved away from recognizing disabilities 
per se and have used the case-by-case model now advocated by the EEOC.196 
Note that a tension exists between the requirements for disability status and 
the per se approach to alcoholism as a disability.197  The social stigma that 
follows alcohol abuse often is cited for the need for a per se rule.198  However, 
a per se rule means that alcoholic plaintiffs never need to assert how alcohol 
has affected their life, and therefore, they will always qualify for protection 
 
 189. EEOC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 112, at § 1630.2(j)(2001).  The EEOC gives 
an example of how an impairment can affect people differently: a person with a mild form of 
Type II non-insulin dependent diabetes does not have limits on her major life activities and is not 
disabled even though diabetes is usually considered a disability.  Id. 
 190. Job Accommodation Network, supra note 33. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Locke, supra note 128, at 113.  EEOC Interpretative Guidance, supra note 112, at § 
1630.2(j) (2001). 
 193. Locke, supra note 128, at 113. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702 (2001). 
 196. Locke, supra note 128, at 113-14.  Locke notes that the judiciary has changed in 
response to suits brought alleging minor impairments and has become “increasingly intolerant of 
what they perceive to be attempts by minimally impaired individuals to manipulate the law.”  Id. 
at 114. 
 197. Voss, supra note 50, at 911. 
 198. The element of social stigma is especially relevant to the “regarded as” prong of 
disability.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(c)  (1994). 
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under the ADA.199  The per se rule is contrary to Congress’ goal of enhancing 
employment protection for people with actual disabilities.200  A per se rule 
gives people relief based on a name, not a condition that affects a major life 
activity.  Individual inquiry advocates assert that a case-by-case analysis will 
properly evaluate the unique situation of each alcoholic asking for protection 
and will result in the correct reflection of Congressional intent.201 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The current circuit split should be resolved by giving deference to circuits 
that advocate the use of an individualized inquiry when determining if a 
person’s alcoholism qualifies as a disability.202  A per se definition of 
alcoholism is not only counterintuitive, but rests on broad generalizations 
about the addiction which may or may not have a basis in truth.  The need for 
an individualized inquiry is firmly grounded in Congressional intent.203  
Furthermore, Supreme Court cases dealing with the definition of “disability” 
under the ADA give credence to the notion that alcoholism is not a per se 
disability and advocate a case by case evaluation of each plaintiff.204  Most 
importantly, an individualized inquiry approach will best act to preserve the 
interests of the truly disabled in the employment arena, which was the intent of 
Title I.205 
A. Congressional Intent 
Determining Congressional intent does not necessitate looking any further 
than the statute itself.206  Congress specifically stated that the ADA was 
designed with the intention to “provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”207  The statute itself follows this purpose by defining disability as 
a “substantial limit” on a “major life activity,” and, additionally, the EEOC 
regulations list the factors to be considered in determining if someone is 
substantially limited.208  Furthermore, the EEOC regulations do not provide a 
 
 199. Voss, supra note 150, at 912. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 947 n.77. 
 202. For a list of the circuits which follow the individualized inquiry approach, see supra note 
6. 
 203. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (1994). 
 204. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 
624 (1998). 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. at (b)(1). 
 208. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) & (j) (2001). 
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“laundry list” of disabilities, demonstrating that Congress advocated an 
“individualized approach” when structuring the ADA.209 
The general framework provided by Congress as to what constitutes a 
disability has been criticized as vague.210  The suggestion has been made that 
Congress deliberately intended the ADA to be vague in order to allow courts to 
interpret the statute broadly, which would ensure an expansive reading of the 
statute.211  In order to prevent this, the courts need to consistently follow the 
statutory scheme to prevent the adoption of “sweeping rules” concerning 
specific disabilities.212  Congress intended the ADA to have a broad scope of 
coverage, however, Congress also intended to limit the ADA to individuals 
who genuinely need protection.213  There can be no doubt that Congress 
intended an individualized inquiry to determine if an alcoholic is disabled as 
defined by Title I of the ADA. 
Congress considered the status of alcoholism as a disability during the 
debates leading up to the ratification of the ADA.214  In fact, there was a 
movement in the House of Representatives to specifically exclude alcoholism 
and addiction to illegal drugs from protection under the ADA.215  The Chandler 
Amendment,216 which was ultimately defeated, demonstrates that some 
members of the House had reservations about alcoholism as a disability.217 
Congress specifically discussed alcoholism in the context of the definition 
of disability.218  Concerned about the status of alcoholism as a disability, 
Representative Don Edwards, of the House Subcommittee of Civil and 
Constitutional Rights, thoroughly questioned Chai R. Feldblum, a 
 
 209. See supra note 112. 
 210. See supra note 26. 
 211. Laing P. Akers, The Wrong Standard, The Right Decision: Opening Pandora’s Box in 
Bragdon v. Abbott, 28 CAP. U. L. REV. 421, 452 (2000) (asserting that the Bragdon Court’s 
decision to include reproduction as a major life activity broadens the statute and “represents a step 
backward from the intent of Congress”). 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Hoyer Cites Chandler’s Recovery from Alcoholism in ADA Debate, 18 THE 
ALCOHOLISM REP., at 4 (June 1990). 
 216. Id.  The Chandler Amendment, proposed by Representative Rod Chandler (interestingly, 
Chandler was a recovering alcoholic), would allow an employer to take into consideration an 
individual’s history of drug and alcohol addiction or alcoholism, the time period the individual 
has been free of the substance and the individual has successfully completed treatment before 
being assigned to a safety sensitive position.  Id.  The amendment was rejected, and it was noted 
in the debate that the ADA provided that if a person’s use of alcohol was s direct threat then the 
person does not need to be hired.  Id. 
 217. Id. The bill was rejected by a vote of 280 to 143.  Id. 
 218. Hearings, supra note 24, at 73 (statement of Chai R. Feldblum, Legislative Counsel, 
Am. Civil Liberties Union). 
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representative of the American Civil Liberties Union.219  Ms. Feldblum stated 
that a person with alcoholism is to be treated the same as any other person with 
a disability in that they also must make out the prima facie case.220  A person 
alleging their alcoholism amounts to a disability under the ADA must assert 
that he or she is “qualified,” and, therefore, must undergo an individualized 
inquiry.221 
The Duda court, in which the Seventh Circuit followed a per se approach, 
initially stated that to determine if the plaintiff was qualified to bring a claim 
under the ADA it was necessary for the court to turn to the statutory 
definitions.222  The Seventh Circuit cited the ADA definition of disability, 
major life activity, and the factors for determining if an impairment qualifies as 
substantially limiting in its majority opinion.223  In reaching the conclusion that 
medically diagnosed mental conditions are disabilities, the Seventh Circuit did 
not follow its own claim that “Mr. Duda must satisfy the threshold requirement 
of demonstrating that he is a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ under the 
ADA.”224  The court did not show how Duda’s alcoholism substantially limited 
a major life activity because it accepted him as disabled by the mere diagnosis 
of his condition.225  The court set the stage for an individualized inquiry; 
however, it ignored its own words by advocating a per se approach. 
Ultimately, Congress recognized that forty-three million Americans have 
one or more physical or mental disabilities.226  The source of Congress’ finding 
is not clear, with several sources attributed to the forty-three million person 
figure.227  The Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines asserted, “the 
finding that 43 million Americans are disabled gives content to the ADA’s 
terms, specifically the term ‘disability.’”228  The Court found that Congress did 
not intend to include individuals who use corrective devices to mitigate their 
disabilities; if they did they would have recognized a “much higher number” of 
 
 219. Id.  During Ms. Fledblum’s talk, Rep. Dannemeyer interrupted, stating, “I don’t think 
that there is anybody in this room that objects to a law stating that for the construction of new 
buildings we have to make those buildings accommodating to persons in wheelchairs.  There is 
no quarrel about that.  We don’t have to spend our time on that.”  The debate then returned to the 
discussion of alcoholism and the ADA.  Id. at 75. 
 220. Id. at 73. 
 221. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994). 
 222. Duda, 133 F.3d at 1058. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1059. 
 225. Id. 
 226. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994). 
 227. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.  The Court notes that while the exact source of the 43 million 
person finding is not known, the finding used in the 1968 precursor to the ADA was taken from a 
report prepared by the National Council on Disability.  Id.  For a complete discussion on the 
possible origination of the 43 million figure, see id. at 484-88. 
 228. Id. at 487. 
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disabled individuals in their findings.229  The Court’s assertion that individuals 
who use mitigating measures are not disabled for the purposes of the ADA, 
curbed the number of people who can obtain relief under the ADA.230  
Accordingly, recognizing every alcoholic as per se disabled would necessitate 
enlarging Congress’ forty-three million people finding, as there are 
approximately 13.8 million alcoholics in the United States.231  Congress could 
not have intended that every alcoholic, regardless of the addiction’s effect on 
their life, be included under the protections of the ADA because this would 
make up a large segment of Congress’ perception of the nation’s disabled 
population.  Rather, Congress only intended to include individuals whose 
alcoholism substantially limits one or more major life activities to fall within 
the parameters of the ADA. 
B. Supreme Court jurisprudence 
It is not necessary to look any further than prior Supreme Court decisions 
to determine that an individualized approach is necessitated by the ADA.  
Notably, several courts, including the Supreme Court, have taken a restrictive 
view of which individuals are protected by the ADA.232  Employee plaintiffs 
often lose at the summary judgment level because they are unable to 
demonstrate they have a disability under the ADA.233  Although the Supreme 
Court has not granted certiorari in an ADA case with an alcoholic plaintiff, two 
recent cases discuss the correct standard to use when determining if an 
individual is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. 
In Bragdon v. Abbott 234 the Court interpreted §12102 to determine that the 
plaintiffs’ a-symptomatic HIV infection constituted a disability within the 
protection of the ADA.235  In Bragdon the Court asserted that disability status 
could be determined by asking whether a physical or a mental impairment 
substantially limits an individual’s major life activities.236  The Court did not 
accept a-symptomatic HIV as a disability per se, but rather applied the 
statutory test to determine how the a-symptomatic HIV affected the plaintiff’s 
 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 484-86 
 231. See Job Accommodation Network, supra note 33. 
 232. Claudia Maclachlan, Employers Winning ADA Suits, NAT’L. L.J., July 31, 2000, at B1.  
Maclachlan notes that employers win nine out of ten disability cases in federal court.  Id.  This 
rate has actually increased since the enactment of the ADA.  Id.  However, this number does not 
take into account settlements, which generally favor employees.  Id. 
 233. Id.  Recall the prima facie elements of a Title I ADA claim.  See supra note 3. 
 234. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 235. Id at 631.  The Court found that a-symptomatic HIV substantially limited Bragdon’s 
major life activity of reproduction.  Id. at 639. 
 236. Id. at 632. 
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major life activities.237  This case provides a thorough examination of how an 
individual can be substantially limited in a major life activity.238  The Court 
used the statutory scheme, namely the definition of “substantially limits,” to 
determine that reproduction is a major life activity and that a-symptomatic HIV 
is considered a disability.239  The Court found that Bragdon’s HIV infection 
substantially limited a major life activity, therefore, they declined to address 
whether HIV qualified as a per se disability.240  Importantly, the Supreme 
Court used the individual inquiry to determine if an impairment amounts to a 
disability.241  The Supreme Court’s analysis should be extended from the realm 
of a-symptomatic HIV to all disabilities, including alcoholism. 
The Supreme Court in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.242 reaffirmed the 
need for an individualized inquiry, this time in the context of severe myopia.243  
The Court asserted that whether a person has a disability is an individualized 
inquiry; and therefore, looked into the twin plaintiffs’ disabilities on an 
individual basis.244  The Court spent considerable time interpreting the phrase 
“substantially limits” before determining that it was in the “present indicative 
verb form,” and therefore, a person must be presently limited, not 
hypothetically or potentially limited.245  The Court rejected taking a view that 
people are disabled because of the name of their impairment and the general 
effect it has on a person, stating this would create a system where people are 
treated as a member of a group and not as individuals.246  The Court notes that 
this approach is “[c]ontrary to both the letter and spirit of the ADA.”247  The 
ADA is based on the principle of treating people as individuals, which is 
 
 237. Id. at 639-40. 
 238. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639-42. 
 239. Id. at 641.  The Court determined that a-symptomatic HIV substantially limits the major 
life activity of reproduction.  Id.  Included in their reasoning is that the ADA addresses substantial 
limitations, not utter inabilities.  Id.  While a person with a-symptomatic HIV can potentially 
conceive, it is dangerous to public health.  Id.  The Court asserted that this meets the definition of 
a substantial limitation.  Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. 
 240. Id. at 641-42. 
 241. See generally id. at 639-42. 
 242. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).  This case stands primarily for the 
proposition that mitigating measures may be taken into account in determining if an individual is 
a person with a disability.  Id.  In Sutton twin plaintiffs sued United for under the ADA for 
rejecting their employment applications for position of pilot because they did not meet the 
minimum requirement of uncorrected visual acuity of 20/100 or better.  Id at 475. 
 243. Myopia is an eye impairment.  Id.  In this case each of twin plaintiffs had 20/200 vision 
or worse in their right eye and 20/400 in their left eye.  Id. at 475. 
 244. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483. 
 245. Id. at 482. 
 246. Id. at 483.  The Court noted that by this approach a diabetic whose illness does not 
impair his or her daily activities would be considered disabled only because they have diabetes.  
Id. 
 247. Id. at 483-84. 
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accomplished through an individualized inquiry into a person’s disability.  
Failure to perform an individualized inquiry in favor of a per se approach is 
contrary to the stated purpose of the ADA to eliminate discrimination against 
people with actual disabilities. 
C. Protection of the truly “disabled” 
The majority of the recent cases litigated under the ADA deal with 
determining whether “fringe” disabilities constitute disabilities under the 
ADA.248  In fact, in many cases people with “self-inflicted illnesses” were 
included under the protections of the ADA despite the objection of disability 
rights groups.249  Furthermore, many people view addiction as a correctable 
behavior.250  For example, through treatment, many alcoholics have learned to 
live with alcoholism and function normally in society; and, therefore, they do 
not a have a condition that substantially limits a major life activity.  Many 
alcoholics are not substantially limited in their ability to work, walk, talk, sleep 
or perform other major life functions; therefore, they are not entitled to 
protection under the ADA.  The ADA did not intend to protect people with 
temporary problems, but meant to cover people with permanent problems that 
substantially limit a major life activity.251  If properly followed, the statutory 
definition of disability ensures that individuals with actual disabilities receive 
ADA protection.252  Including alcoholism as a per se disability would 
undermine the claims of the truly disabled, thus making the true victims the 
very people the ADA was written to protect.  While this is not to say that an 
alcoholic can never be considered disabled, only individuals with alcoholism 
that “substantially limits a major life activity” should be entitled to the 
protections of the ADA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The ADA is a well-intentioned statute that has positively affected the lives 
of many of America’s disabled.  However, the protection of the ADA should 
not be expanded arbitrarily to people who do not meet the statutory test for 
disability.  The importance of the definition of disability is seen because it is a 
 
 248. Edward McEntee, There’s a Big Difference Between a ‘Stress Disorder’ and 
Quadriplegia, THE WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1997, at B2. 
 249. Id.  McEntee includes in the category of self-inflicted illness stress disorder, drug 
dependence, and alcoholism.  Id.  Not everyone believes that alcoholism is a self-inflicted illness.  
See supra note 38.  People who follow the disease theory advocate that alcoholics are not 
responsible for having the disease.  Id. 
 250. Lawsuit Addiction: ‘Disabled’ by Drugs; Methadone Clinic Doesn’t Deserve ADA 
Protection, THE CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 10, 2000 at A20. 
 251. Gary S. Becker, Are We Hurting or Helping the Disabled?, BUS. WK. , Aug. 2, 1989, at 
21. 
 252. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994). 
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prima facie element of a plaintiff’s case.  While some alcoholics deserve 
protection under the ADA, we owe it to the truly disabled to rationally 
determine if an alcoholic deserves protection under the ADA.  A clearly 
defined standard adopted uniformly by all circuits would take the risk out of 
employer-employee relations and enable employers to effectively run 
businesses without fear of being challenged by a baseless claim.  Additionally, 
preservation of judicial time and resources can be served if all circuits apply an 
individualized inquiry.  Most importantly, the individualized inquiry will best 
serve the truly disabled as mandated by the purposes and provisions of the 
ADA. 
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